Descartes and Lock on Speciesism and the Value of Life by Squadrito, Kathy
Descartes and Locke on 
Speciesism and the 
Value of Life 
Kathy Squadrito 
Purdue University, Fort Wayne 
In his history Of Man, Animals, and Morals, 
Brumbaugh contends: "It is hard to know just what to 
make of Descartes' insistence that respect for human 
dignity requires us to show no respect toward animals. 
He does not mean hostility, though as far as I can see 
he would find nothing ethically wrong with hostility, 
except that its motive might be irrational. Whatever we 
make of it, Cartesian thought reinforces tendencies that 
have militated against morality, sensitivity, and realistic 
observation."l On the other hand, Locke is credited with 
the humane position "that causing pain or destroying 
life needlessly" is morally wrong. He points out that 
Locke was convinced that attitudes toward animals 
transfer to attitudes toward other human beings.,,2 
Cartesians have argued that Locke provides a 
philosophical model which denies human freedom, 
contributes to elitism, social control, and racist ideology, 
while it is characteristic of Descartes' philosophy to 
assert the intrinsic dignity of all humans. 3 In this paper 
I argue that the similarities between Descartes and 
Locke are more pronounced than their differences, that 
both regard animals as property to be used to advance 
human life and that both may be accused of elitism with 
regard to tbe value of life. 
In a letter to the Marquess of Newcastle, Descartes 
explains that non-linguistic behavior cannot be a 
criterion of thought or rationality. "I cannot," he says, 
"share the opinion of Montaigne and others who 
attribute understanding or thought to animals," for none 
of our external actions can show "that our body is not 
just a self-moving machine but contains a soul with 
thoughts, with the exception of words, or other signs."4 
For Descartes the difference between man and animal 
is one of kind rather than degree. Animals are natural 
automata, their behavior explicable in terms of the laws 
ofphysics that govern material bodies. Animal behavior 
is not the result of thought, but of "the disposition of 
their organs." Since animals do not use words or signs, 
they cannot be said to possess reason or a degree of 
reason lower than man; that they "have none at all'' 
follows from the fact that they do not speak.5 
For Descartes animal mechanism is the only 
hypothesis consistent with the Christian doctrine of the 
primacy of man's soul. It is more probable, he says, 
"tbat worms and flies and caterpillars move mechan-
ically than that they all have immortal souls." This 
opinion, he states, "is not so much cruel to animals as 
indulgent to men-at least to those who are not given 
to the superstitions of Pythagoras-since it absolves 
them from the suspicion of crime when they eat or kill 
animals."6 The possession of a rational, illl1llortaI soul 
constitutes a morally relevant difference between 
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humans and animals, a difference which justifies 
speciesism.7 
It is certain that in the bodies of animals, as 
in ours, there are bones, nerves, muscles, 
animal spirits, and other organs so disposed 
that they can by themselves, without any 
thought, give rise to all the animal motions 
we observe. This is very clear in convulsive 
movements when the machine of the body 
moves despite the soul, and sometimes more 
violently and in a more varied manner than 
when it is moved by the will.s 
In the Principles he asserts that the highest perfection 
of man is "to have the power of acting freely or by will, 
and that this is what renders him deserving of either 
praise or blame.''9 
The most intelligent of all animals would not, for 
Descartes, be comparable to humans considered to be 
marginal cases (mentally or physically impaired). He 
points out that "it is a very remarkable fact that there 
are none so depraved and stupid, without even excepting 
idiots, that they cannot arrange different words together, 
forming of them a statement by which they make known 
their thoughts; while on the other hand, there is no other 
animal, however perfect and fortunately circumstanced 
it may be, which can do the same."IO Descartes admits 
that within species, some animals are "more perfect" 
than others. This can be seen, he says, "in horses and 
dogs, some of whom learn what they are taught much 
better than others." Although animals can learn 
commands and can communicate anger, fear, and 
hunger, their behavior is due to "natural impulse" or 
instinct and not pure thought. However "stupid and 
insane" some people may be, "and though they may 
lack tongue and organs of voice," they can nonetheless 
use signs which indicate thought and the possession of 
a rational soul. H 
Since animals are mere corporeal beings and 
humans are a union of mind and body, there can be no 
real comparison between the two. Animals are not 
simply less perfect than humans, they do not share 
human perfections at all. The difference here is one of 
essential, not accidental properties; species differences 
are real, not arbitrary. Because man's essential 
properties res\de in his spirit it seems reasonable to 
presume that within the human species all lives are 
equal or equally valuable. 
Between the Species 
Bracken has written extensively about the difficulty 
of stating a racist or sexist position if one is a Cartesian. 
Man's "colour, his language, his biology, even his sex" 
are accidental, not essential properties.12 This notwith-
standing, Descartes does distinguish spirits or souls in 
accordance with a scale of perfection. "It is easy to 
believe," he says, "that all the souls that God places in 
human bodies are not equally noble and strong."13 A 
human body is not different than the body of an animal; 
if not "mastered" by the soul an individual would not 
be much different than an animal. A noble and strong 
soul is one that has a good degree of control or mastery 
over the body. With the exception of not determining 
value in accordance with species, some contemporary 
critics of inherent value theories do not differ 
significantly from Descartes' perfectionist view of 
man.14 Frey, for example, argues that mere existence 
does not confer value; the exercise of autonomy does. 
By exercising autonomy we can pursue a conception 
of the good life, a life which includes a variety ofcultural 
and intellectual achievements. What is missing in the 
case of animals is the "same scope or potentiality for 
enrichment." According to Frey, lives of less richness 
have less value. Given this criterion, some human lives 
have more value than others. Individuals are ranked on 
the basis of specific virtues and talents, intellectual, 
moral, and artistic. ls 
Like Frey, Descartes insists on ranking individuals 
in accordance with certain perfections. Within a single 
species of animal, he says, some "are more perfect than 
others, as men are too." All humans are born with free 
will and with the capacity to distinguish good from evil. 
According to Descartes, the value of a human life is tied 
to the same variables that distinguish humans as a species 
from animals, viz., free-will, language, and rational 
thought. Control over passions arising from the body is 
possible only with knowledge and correct reasoning. 
There is "no soul so feeble," he contends, that "it cannot, 
if well directed, acquire an absolute power over its 
passions."16 Vices such as irrationality, excess hatred, 
cowardice and jealousy can be remedied by education. 
Descartes contends that "low and feebleminded" souls 
cannot control passions; "noble and strong" souls do so 
and disdain nothing but vice. Those who have a "low 
and feeble mind," he says, "are subject to sin by excess;" 
passing from superstition to impiety, "there is no vice 
nor disorder of the mind of which they are not capable." 
According to Descartes, those who have a noble, strong 
and generous soul are inclined to render each man "what 
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penains to him" and thus have not only a "very profound 
humility in regard to God" but also "render without any 
repugnance all the honour and respect which is due to 
each man according to the rank and authority which he 
has in the world."17 Blom correctly notes that Descartes 
is comfortable with speaking of civilized and uncivilized. 
"More relevant," he notes, is Descartes' "insistence upon 
fostering genuine culture of which philosophy, which is 
at once our 'sovereign good' and the highest expression 
of human reason, is the greatest manifestation. Thus we 
never find Descartes dreaming of an innocent savage. 
Rather, good fortune for both individual and society 
begins with imitating actions approved by those of 
higher wisdom."18 
For Descartes, the right to life is species specific 
and applicable to all humans and humans only. 
However, since not all humans are of equal value, 
Descartes accords some humans preferential treatment. 
Although animal life has no value other than that of 
utility for human beings, Descartes admits that not all 
things were created for man.19 
Unlike Descartes, Locke argues that the difference 
between man and animal is one of degree rather than 
kind. In 2.11.11 of the Essay he contends that if animals 
"have any Ideas at all, and are not bare machines (as 
some would have them) we cannot deny them to have 
some Reason. It seems as evident to me, that they do 
some of them in certain Instances reason, as that they 
have sence,"20 His disagreement with Descartes is based 
on three contentions; first, the real essence of mind and 
matter is unknown, second, non-linguistic observable 
behavior must be taken as evidence that animals reason 
and have emotions, and third, a rejection of dualism. 
Locke defines the real essence of objects as their 
internal or atomic constitution, an essence which is 
unknown. Since we cannot classify species of things 
by real (unknown) essences, classification into species 
is determined by the observable characteristics that 
particular objects share. The definition of a bird, for 
example, is not based on a natural or real essence, but 
on observable properties that birds have in common. 
Locke refers to this definition as the nominal essence 
or abstract idea of birds. We cannot reasonably think, 
he says, "that the ranking ofthings under general Names 
was regulated by those internal real Constitutions, or 
anything else but their obvious appearances; Since 
Languages, in all Countries, have been established long 
before Sciences,"21 Locke often includes the predicates 
of tllinking and reasoning in tlle nominal essence of 
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cenain animals. It follows that some animals differ from 
man in degree rather than kind. 
Locke's scepticism with respect to determining the 
real nature or essence of the mind prevents him from 
drawing an absolute distinction between humans and 
animals. In 4.3.6 he contends that it is conceivable that 
humans as well as animals may be nothing more than 
material beings. We have "the Ideas of Matter and 
Thinking," he says, "but possibly shall never be able to 
know, whether any mere material Being thinks, or no; 
it being impossible for us, by the contemplation of our 
own Ideas, without revelation, to discover, whether 
Omnipotency has not given to some systems of Matter 
fitly disposed a thinking immaterial Substance: it being, 
in respect to our Notions, not much more remote from 
our Comprehension to conceive, that God can, if he 
pleases, superadd to it another Substance, with a Faculty 
of Thinking; since we know not wherein Thinking 
consists, nor to what sort of Substance the Almighty 
has been pleased to give that Power," 
Locke argues that it is not a contradiction for God 
to grant immortality to life forms that are not immaterial. 
Unlike Descartes he does not consider speculation about 
the soul, whether human or animal, to be of any 
importance to religion or philosophy. For Locke, 
animals differ from humans in degree of rationality. 
Having general or abstract ideas is, he says, "that which 
puts a perfect distinction betwixt Man and Brutes; and 
is an Excellency which the Faculties of Brutes do by 
no means attain to." Like humans, animals receive 
simple or particular ideas and have the capacity to 
remember such ideas: "This faculty of laying up, and 
retaining the Ideas, that are brought into the Mind, 
several other Animals seem to have, to a great degree, 
as well as man."22 
Like Descartes, Locke holds a perfectionist view of 
value in which animals, lacking the intellectual 
perfections of man, are considered as having utilitarian 
value only. Locke actually goes a step further than 
Descartes in claiming categorically that God has given 
all animals to humans as property. In the First Treatise 
he claims that there is no doubt that God has granted 
humans a right to the "use of' creatures "for the desire, 
strong desire of Preserving his Life" and thus, he 
concludes, "Man's Property in the Creatures, was 
founded upon the right he had, to make use of tllOse 
things, that were necessary or useful to his Being."23 
Man's "Propriety in the creatures," he says "is nothing 
but tllatLiberty to use them, which Godhas permitted."24 
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The type of awareness and rationality that Locke 
attributes to various animals is comparable to that which 
he attributes to the human fetus and young children. In 
this case, the ideas received by sensation include hunger, 
warmth, light, and pain. Since the mind is furnished 
with ideas gradually, there are "few signs of a Soul 
accustomed to much thinking in a new born Child, and 
much fewer of any Reasoning at all." Qualitatively, the 
mental life of a fetus is comparable to that of an oyster 
or to vegetables. He who considers this, says Locke, 
"will, perbaps find Reason to imagine, That a Foetus 
in the Mother's Womb differs not much from the State 
ofa Vegetable; but passes the greatest part of its time 
without Perception or Thought."25 
Locke does not consider species central to 
detennining the value of life. Whether humans and 
animals are something more than organized systems 
of matter, the qualitative distinctions between them 
are based on degrees of perception, memory, and 
corresponding mental activity. Locke does not 
hesitate to express the view that some people lead a 
life which is qualitatively lower than that of some 
animals. His position is not unlike that expressed by 
Frey. Frey, for example, contends: "If few people 
consider animal life to be without value, equally few, 
I think, consider it to bave the same value as nonnal 
(adult) human.life. They need not be speciesists as a 
result: in my view; nonnal (adult) human life is of a 
much higher quality than animal life, not because of 
species, but because of richness; and the value of a 
life is a function of its qUality." Frey argues that his 
position is not speciesist because it does not use 
species membership to detennine the value of lives; 
it quite explicitly allows, he says, "that some animal 
. life may be more valuable than some human life."26 
In accordance with this view Locke states: "For were 
there a Monkey, or any Creature to be found, that 
had the use of Reason to such a degree, as to be able 
to understand general Signs, and to deduce 
Consequences about general Ideas, he would no 
doubt be subject to Law, and, in that Sense, be a Man, 
how mucb soever he differed in Shape from others 
of that Name.''27 
Locke regards the value of some elderly people, as 
well as of idiots, to be similar to that of the lowest of 
animals. Of oysters, he says, "I cannot but think, there 
is some small dull Perception, whereby they are 
distinguished from perfect Insensibility," and, he says, 
even in mankind itself we have plain instances: 
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Take one, in whom decrepid old Age has 
blotted out the Memory of his past Knowledge, 
and clearly wiped out the Ideas his Mind was 
fonnerly stored with; and has, by destroying 
his Sight, Hearing, and Smell quite, and his 
Taste to a great degree, stopp'd up almost all 
the Passages for new ones to enter; or, if there 
be some of the Inlets yet half open, the 
Impressions made are scarce perceived, or not 
at all retained. How far such an one.. .is in his 
Knowledge, and intellectual Faculties, above 
the Condition ofa Cockle, or an Oyster, I leave 
to be considered. And if a Man had passed 
Sixty Years in such a State, as 'tis possible he 
might, as well as three Days, I Wonder what 
difference there would have been, in any 
intellectual Perfections, between him and the 
lowest degree of Animals.28 
According to Locke, those considered to be idiots bave 
dull perceptions, retain few ideas, do not compound or 
abstract ideas, do not judge, think, "make very few or 
no Propositions, and reason scarce at all."29 
Like Descartes, Locke places ultimate value on 
intellectual pursuits and abstract philosophical 
reasoning. He argues that shape, sex and color are not 
relevant variables in the detennination of value. "Shall 
a defect in the Body make a Monster; a defect in the 
Mind, (the far more Noble, and, in the common phrase, 
the far more Essential Part) not? Shall the want of a 
Nose, or a Neck, make a Monster, and put such Issue 
out of the rank of Men; the want of Reason and 
Understanding, not? This is to bring all back again, to 
what was exploded just now: This is to place all in the 
Shape, and to take the measure of a Man only by his 
out-side."3o Thus, notwithstanding, Locke's view, as 
well as Descartes', can be charged with elitism. The 
quality of life for both is detennined by the arbitrary 
standard of intellectual acumen, more precisely, 
European standards of rationality. For Locke, abstract 
reasoning and the development of culture and property 
are intimately connected. God, says Locke, gave the 
world "to the use of the Industrious and Rational."31 
According to Locke, God commanded man to labor the 
earth, and so entitled him to appropriate whatever land 
and other goods he mixed his labor with. 
The degree of rationality that is a necessary 
condition of the right to acquire and to dispose of 
property is specified in the Second Treatise in tenns 
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of a capacity to distinguish moral right from wrong. 
Locke states: "The Law that was to govern Adam, was 
the same that was to govern all his Posterity, the Law 
ofReason." The law of reason or natural law "in its 
true Notion, is not so much the limitation as the 
direction of a free and intelligent Agent to his proper 
interest." To the question, What gives a person "a free 
disposing of his Property according to his own Will, 
within the compass of that Law?" Locke replies, "State 
of Maturity wherein he might be suppos'd capable to 
know that Law so that he might keep his Actions within 
the Bounds of it."32 The natural law is a God given set 
of rules and principles of right and justice. According 
to Locke, natural rights are discovered by reason and 
include the right to life, liberty, and property. It is clear 
that anyone who does not understand and obey God's 
command to labor and the law of reason (children, 
animals, some elderly people, idiots) does not have 
property rights and is of relatively little value to self 
or to society. Those who labor more and who 
accumulate more property are ofmore value than those 
who do not labor or own property. "Labour," he says 
"makes thefar greater part ofthe value of things we 
enjoy in this World." 
Locke contends that land "left wholly to Nature, that 
hath no improvement of Pasttrage, Tilage, or Planting 
is called, as indeed it is, Waste; and we shall find the 
benefit of it amount to little more than nothing."33 
"There cannot," says Locke, "be a clearer demonstration 
of any thing than several Nations of the Americans are 
of this, who are rich in land, and poor in all the Comforts 
of Life; whom Nature having furnished as liberally as 
any other people, with the materials of Plenty, i.e. a 
fruitful Soil, apt to produce abundance, what might 
serve for food, rayment, and delight; yet for want of 
improving it by labour, have not one hundredth of the 
Conveniencies we enjoy.,,34 Locke accords little value 
to Native Americans, regarding their life style as a 
backward state of nature. "Thus in the beginning," he 
says, "all the World was America."35 It is assumed that 
the quality of life is better, and hence more valuable, in 
a state of society or "civilization." According to Locke, 
God gave the land for the benefit of all mankind. Those 
who do not cultivate or use it, leave the land to waste, a 
violation of the common good. Locke would not find it 
plausible to argue that land used by animals and plants 
is not waste. 
Given the emphasis that both Descartes and Locke 
place on reason and science, it is not surprising that 
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their conclusions with respect to the value of life are 
similar. The fact that Descartes is usually considered a 
speciesist while Locke is not, does not entail that Locke 
regards animals as having any more value than 
Descartes. Descartes' position is one of strong 
speciesism while Locke's view is best described as weak 
speciesism. Both regard animals as tools to further 
human interest, both appeal to God to support such a 
view, and both stress the necessity of mastery over 
animals and nature. The highest degree of value is 
assigned to those who possess abstract reasoning and 
use it "correctly" to benefit self and mankind. 
Schouls argues persuasively that Descartes' views 
were absorbed rather than rejected by the Enlight-
enment, that Descartes, Locke and Newton shared a 
common method, a method from which they "expected 
liberation and mastery." Views which deny the status 
of "Enlightenment thinker" to Descartes, but accord it to 
Locke, are regarded as superficial. Schouls points out: 
It is correct to say that the central doctrines of 
Locke's Essay determine Locke's thoughts on 
education. It is equally correct to say that 
Locke shared these doctrines with Descartes, 
and that Descartes had published them more 
than a decade before Locke became an 
undergraduate at Christ Church, Oxford. In 
Descartes' works these doctrines playas 
crucial a role as they do in Locke's. The 
doctrines in question are those about man as a 
rational being and about method or the nature 
of reasoning, about man as a free being 
questing for mastery.36 
Neither Descartes nor Locke consider reason or 
knowledge an end in itself. In the Discourse Descartes 
contends that the principles of science cannot be 
"concealed without greatly sinning against the law 
which obliges us to procure, as much as in us lies, the 
general good of mankind." He urges a "practical 
philosophy by means of which ...we can ... render 
ourselves the masters and possessors of nature."3? 
Like Descartes, Locke stresses the connection 
between human freedom and the capacity to reason: 
The Freedom then of Man and Liberty of 
acting according to his own will, is grounded 
on his having Reason, which is able to instruct 
him in that Law he is to govern himself by, 
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and make him know how far he is left to the 
freedom of his own will. To tum him loose to 
an unrestrain'd Liberty, before he has Reason 
to guide him, is not the allowing him the 
priviledge ofhis Nature, to be free; but to thrust 
him out amongst Brutes, and abandon him to 
a state as wretched, and as much beneath that 
of a Man, as things.38 
Both Descartes and Locke assign value to humans 
by contrast to animals and nature, a traditional 
comparison that when adopted by Americans resulted 
in the degradation and exploitation of those seen as 
closer to nature. With regard to Blacks and Native 
Americans, for example, Deloria notes: "Both groups 
had been defined as animals with which the white 
had to have some relation and around whom some 
attitude must be formed. Blacks were ex-draft 
animals ... Indians were ex-wild animals who had 
provided the constant danger for the civilizing 
tendencies of the invading white." The notion that 
cultures cannot be judged by the standards of other 
cultures is precluded by faith in reason, science, and 
progress, by the rejection of superstition.39 That 
which is closer to nature (the less rational) is deemed 
a worthy object of control, mastery, and change. 
Following Locke's description of the state of nature, 
Jefferson regarded the American Indian as an inferior 
uncivilized human, yet a being capable of rising to a 
state of civil society by the use of reason. This would 
be achieved by education, by giving up superstitious 
customs, earthly passions, <;ommunal ownership of 
land, and by settling down as farmers. Like Descartes, 
Locke regards the chief obstacle to the use of reason 
as "our passionate nature" or "brute" appetites. He 
is somewhat more pessimistic than Descartes about 
the ability of all people to overcome such appetites 
for the life of reason. 
Both Descartes and Locke support a performance 
model of man. Both support a hierarchy of perfection 
based on analytic reasoning. In spite of Locke's 
protestation that all men are born free and equal and 
Descartes' claim that reason, by nature, is equal in all 
men, this equality is short-lived.4o Differences in 
environment, education, and especially in the 
application of reason, result in inequality. Neither 
philosophy is able to fully support an ideology which 
assigns inherent or intrinsic value and dignity to 
animals and humans. 
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